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PACKER INTEGRATION INTO HOG PRODUCTION:
CURRENT STATUS AND LIKELY IMPACTS OF
INCREASED VERTICAL CONTROL ON HOG PRICES
AND QUANTITIES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION:
In a survey conducted three years ago by the staff of Pork '88, it was found
that some of the major players in the pork industry, like Smithfield foods, for
example, have either integrated into hog production or have all the requirements
for vertical integration in place. The move toward internalizing the exchange
process in the hog/pork sector through vertical integration has raised several
questions ranging from its impact on prices and quantities to its impact on
individual hog producers.
This report is a first step toward studying these issues. Its specific objectives
are a) to provide some insights into the nature and determinants of vertical
integration, b) to describe the current status of packer integration into hog
production, and c) to provide a theoretical and empirical assessment of the likely
impact of increased vertical control in the hog industry on hog prices and
quantities.
As a background, Chapter I describes supply/demand characteristics as well
as structural characteristics of the hog/pork sector. Among agricultural commodities, and particularly livestock, the pork sector is characterized by cyclical
output response, unresponsive short run demand, and a trend toward large scale
specialization into hog production and slaughter.

INCENTIVES FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION TRANSACTIONAL
ECONOMIES:
The supply/demand characteristics as well as some aspects of the structural
characteristics of the hog/pork industry make the hog sector a good candidate for
vertical integration. The incentives for vertical integration are created by the
existence of transactional economies.
In practical terms, transactional economies exist when the cost of open
market exchange exceeds the costs of gaining control over quality, quantity, and
price of the intermediate product either through direct ownership or contracting.
If processors integrate to achieve the transactional economies and the market
remains competitive, the cost savings from integration eventually will be passed
on to the producer or consumer.
Under transactional economies there are three main sources for the incentive
to integrate, namely risk and uncertainty, economic efficiency and assuring
adequate supply inputs.
iii

The more prone an industry is to uncertain supply of a material input, the more
likely it will opt for vertical integration or contracts as a risk-reducing strategy.
The economic rationale for this behavior is simple. Other inputs, such as labor,
for example have to be combined with the material input to produce a final output
Thus, as the material input becomes more"uncertain", the ability to utilize the
cost-minimizing levels of all inputs becomes more difficult
While economies of scale may exist at all stages of production and/or
marketing, it may happen that one stage is subject to substantially more scale
economies that the next or previous stage. Data on the emerging structures in hog
packing and hog production points to the divergent scales between the two stages.
Consequently, a packer may opt for integration though ownership or contracts
with several producers to match his scale of operation and, hence, improve
economic efficiency.
Uncertainty about the quality of inputs also induces business to integrate in
order to have a say about how the material input is produced. Obviously, vertical
integration through ownership gives the processor complete management control.
Contractual integration through market-specification contracts or resource providing contracts also gives the processor some control over production practices.
Assurance of adequate supply is perhaps the most often cited incentive for
processors to integrate backward into agricultural production. However, the
notion of"assuring supplies" is more than just avoidance of random fluctuations
in input markets. It entails the inability to obtain the quantity and quality of inputs
that the firm would like to purchase at the prevailing price. As such, it is a market
imperfection and gives rise to transaction costs. The latter are different from
production costs in that they arise from using the open market for transactions.
Whether a business opts for market exchange or integration depends on cost
conditions of the processing plant, variability of the raw material flows, and the
Dollars/units

AC

Quantity

Figure 1.
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cost associated with market exchange. Consider Figure 1 where the U-shape
curve represent the average cost function for a typical processing plant. The
minimum average cost of production occurs at point
If the firm is only able
to purchase quantity Q1, its average cost of processing rises from
and AC 1
or somewhere in between depends on the number of days (shifts) the firm is
compelled to operate at less than full capacity. For example, if the processor
operates at less than full capacity half of the time, then its annual production will
be at
at an average cost of
The potential cost saving due to integration
are represented by the distance
to
Whether a business integrates
backward to assure supplies, depends on whether the cost savings more than
offset the costs of internally producing the material input or acquiring it through
contracts.

IMPERFECT COMPETITION
Another less obvious phenomenon which gives rise to several incentives for
processors to vertically integrate, aside from transactional economies, is imperfect competition. Imperfect competition may arise for example, when there is
increased concentration in the slaughter industry.
Are there signs which indicate the slaughter industry may be characterized
by imperfect competition? Well, the leading packers in the seventies have been
replaced by companies that specialize in high volume, low cost plants. This has
occurred only in those plants slaughtering more than one million head annually.
The share of the latter plants in total hog slaughter increased by more than
percent between the year 1972 and 1988 and amounted to more than 75 percent
of total U.S. hog slaughter (Figure 2). The consensus among those who follow
75
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the industry closely is that of slaughtering concentration will increase over the
next few years.
plants have shut
During this period of industry transformation, more than
down across the United States, as have 217 auction yards, 372 dealer and order
buyers and 3 terminal markets. A consequence of this declin_e is that fewer outlets
are available for producers to sell their hogs. In a recent Farm Bureau Survey, it
was found that 76 percent of those responding have access to only one or two
markets.
Economic theory predicts that when a market for an intermediate input is
imperfect, the price and quantity of the intermediate inputs would be less than
what they would be had the market been perfectly competitive. The degree to
which the quantity and price of the input diverge from the competitive level
depends on the degree of market power exercised by the buyers of the intermediate inputs. The degree of market power is a function of three things: the number
of firms, the nature of strategic behavior between the buyers, and the degree of
supply response by the producers of the intermediate inputs.
The incentives under imperfect competition come from three sources:
internalization of the efficiency losses from imperfect competition, 2) the ability
to extractrents from the competitive producers,and 3) the ability to price discriminate
among the competitive producers of the intermediate inputs. Economic theory
also predicts that when the price of the intermediate inputs diverges from its
competitive levels, an efficiency loss arises. In practical terms, the efficiency loss
is the difference between the dollar loss to consumers and producers (engendered
by market imperfections) and the extra profits made by the processor (also
engendered by market imperfections). Interestingly, one way for the processor
to convert the efficiency loss to profits is through backward integration. After we
presentsomeresultsofoursurvey, wewillsimulatethepriceandquantityimpacts
of increased vertical integration under the scenario of imperfect competition.

Contractual and Ownership Integration-Survey Results
Our survey results indicate that, on a national level, (Figure 3) hog packers
who slaughter
head or less annually acquired about 38.56 percent of their
Public Markets

Direct Purchase
Hogs
Figure 3. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer size <

Cattle
head

hogs from public markets, 58.64 percent by direct purchase, and 2.67 percent
through forward cash contacts. The percentage of hogs actually owned and fed
bythehogpackerincompanyownedfacilitiesrepresentedonly0.13percent. The
seventy two hog packers who responded to the survey represent more than half
the actual packer population in the<
category reported in 1988. Assuming
the response to our survey is representative of this category, and knowing that
close to
hogs were slaughtered by packers in the
head and less
category, roughly
hogs were owned and fed in packer-owned facilities.
Figure 3 also shows the same breakdown for beef packers in the same size
category. It is worth noting that while acquiring cattle through contracts
represents only 1 percent in this size category, compared to 3 percent in hogs,
about 5 percent of the cattle is actually owned in this category. About two percent
is owned and fed in custom lots and 3 percent is owned and fed in company-owned
lots.
Packer ownership of hogs in company-owned facilities is a little bit higher
percent of all
in the
to
head category. It represented about
hogs in this category and range from to percent. The rest was acquired from
either public markets or direct purchase (Figure 4). Figure 4 also shows how the
distribution of hogs by source compares with cattle. Again, cattle owned and fed
in company facilities in this category is more than three times that of hogs. One
beef packer in this category reported owning
percent of his slaughter cattle.

Public Markets

Cattle

Hogs
Figure 4. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer size

99,999 head

Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of hogs by source for the two size
categories
- 299,999 head and>
head, respectively. In the
- 299 ,999 head category, none of the hogs were contracted orowned. On
the other hand, 1.43 percent of cattle in the same category were forward
contracted and close to 3 percent were owned and fed in custom lot facilities.
In higher category,>
head (Figure 6), close to 8 percent of hogs fall
in the captive category, of which 3.64 percent is forward contracted, 2 percent
is owned and fed in custom facilities, and 1.86 percent in company-owned
facilities. Assuming the proportion of the captive hog supplies are representative
vii

Cattle

Hogs
Figure 5. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer size

299,999 head

Public Markets

Hogs

Cattle

Figure 6. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer size>

head

of the population (57 plants), the total number of hogs in>
category is
roughly 5.8 million head. Beef packers in this category, on the other hand,
acquired about 11 percent of their supply through contracts and 1.4 percent
through ownership and feeding in custom lots.
Figure 7 summarizes the above information across sizes. It is worth noting
that while contracting and ownership of cattle seems to take place across all sizes

Public Markets
Custom Lots

Direct Purchase
Company Owned Lots

Figure 7. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle By Source and Category
Vlll
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in beef packing, it is mostly prevalent among the large sizes in hog packing.
Information on the regional breakdown is in the text

SIMULATING THE IMPACT OF INCREASED VERTICAL CONTROL.
Figure 8 simulates the impact of increased vertical integration on the volume
of hog slaughter under different elasticities of Supply
As the degree of
integration increases, the volume of hog slaughter also increases. For example
at an elasticity of supply of
a level of percent integration will bring forth
about 3.8 percent increase in the volume of hog slaughter. Figure 8 also shows
that as hog supply becomes more responsive, the quantity of hogs forthcoming
to the market is also higher. Figure 9 shows the relationship between the degree
of vertical integration and hog slaughter under varying demand responses,
The more responsive the demand
holding the supply elasticity at a value of
ED=
ED= 1
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curve is the more quantity of hogs forthcoming under increasing levels of vertical
integration. This also implies that the consumer benefits from lower prices ofpork
as output expands.
Figure demonstrates the relationship between the degreeofintegration and
the quantities of hogs purchased from independents. Obviously, although the
total quantity of hogs slaughtered increased, the quantity purchased from
independent hog producers is predicted by the model to decrease by more than
the increase slaughter. For example, at a ten percent level of integration, total
slaughter goes up by 3.8 percent but the quantity purchased from independents
declines by 13 .3 percent. This means, given the magnitude of supply and demand
elasticities, that 17 percent of the hogs are being captive by the processor. Figure
11 shows the same relationship between the degree of integration and purchases
of independents under varying demand responses.
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Figure 12. Degree of Integration and Price Received by Independents (ES)

According to Figure 12, the price to independents also declines with Vertical
integration. At the ten percent level of integration the price paid to independents
declines by about six percent. At fifty percent integration, the price declines by
about 26 percent The more responsive the hog supply curve is, the steeper the
decline in the price of independents. Similarly, the more elastic the demand
curve, the steeper the price received by independents. (Figure 13).
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
Background
Successful performance of a "food supply system requires the coordination
of thousands of decisions made by thousands of producers, processors, wholesalers, distributors, retailers and consumers. When markets are perfect, prices are
the most effective coordinating force. They automatically ration consumption
among those who are willing and able to buy the product, reward those who
produce it, provide incentives for changes in consumption and production, and
guide goods and services through the marketing channels. In this an automatic
coordinating mechanism, "every consumer and producer sits in on the price
committee, as it were, and casts his dollar vote as to what should be produced and
consumed and what prices are needed to do the job of allocating and rationing"
(Shephard, p.
The ability ofa "food supply system" to move the product from farm to retail
depends on a) the nature of supply and demand, and b) market structure. The
nature of supply and demand refers to the degree to which consumers and
producers respond to price changes, in the short-run and long-run, as well as other
non-price factors which influence the level of demand and supply. Market
structure refers to those "organizational characteristics of a market that largely
determine where the market falls in the competition/monopoly spectrum, ... and
is a primary determinant of how much discretion a firm has in setting itsrivalrous
strategies or other aspects of firm conduct" (Connor and Wills, p.126).

Hog Supply Characteristics
Among agricultural commodities, and particularly livestock, the pork sector
is characterized by cyclical output response. The cycles reflect aggregate
producer response to current as well as expected profitability of the enterprise.
When profit opportunities are on the horizon, individual producers expand. The
combined effect of all producers expanding output subsequently depresses
prices. If input prices do not decline to offset the output price decline, profits are
depressed. Some producers size their operations down, others leave the business.
Liquidation and exit from the business leads to smaller supplies of pork, prices
tend higher again, and the cycle continues.
McCorlde defines a "food supply system.. as that system which encompasses the following
activities: production of raw products and other inputs such as packaging materials, the
ing activities which transform inputs into consumer products in their final form or into intermediate
products that are combined with other inputs into a final consumer product; and the storage,
marketing, and distributional activities that make food products available at a time and place to best
2-3).
match consumers' desires, as reflected in demand prices

1

The evidence of output cyclicity (in tenns liveweight production) in the hog
sector can be seen in Table 1.1. Between
and 1986, there were nine cycles
ranging in length from two to seven years. The most frequent length was four
years. Length of expansion phases ranged from one to five years with an average
2.4 years. The average length of contraction phases was 1.8 years with a range
from one to three years. The cyclicity of output is complicated by the lag between
the time producers decide to change output and the time actual changes
materialize. It takes almost one year between breeding and finishing a slaughter
hog for market, and longer than that to augment the breeding herd.

Table 1.1. Hog production cycles

Years
1954-58
1958-61
1961-65
1965-69
1969-73
1973-75
1975-82
1982-86

Length of

Number of Years
Increased

Number of Years
Decreased

2
2
1
3
3
2
1
5
1

2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2

4 years
4 years
3 years
4 years
4 years
4 years
2 years
7 years
4 years

Average length of production cycles,
Average length of increased cycles,
Average length of decreased cycles,

3
years
2.4 years
1.8 years

Source: Futrell and Williams.

Holt and Johnson estimated the response of pork production to changes in the
farm price of hogs , the price ofcom, and interest rates. They found thatan increase
in hog prices actually results in decreased production in subsequent periods. The
rationale for this is that hogs are both a consumption and investment good. In
practical tenns, when current and expected prices of hogs are on the rise,
producers respond by saving more gilts and reducing sow slaughter. Only after
about 4 quarters does the higher price translate into increased production. It also
takes about 4 quarters before an increase in the price of com or interest rates
materializes into decreased production. Holt and Johnson's results also showed
that hog production is more responsive to changes in com price than hog price
or interest rates.

2

Pork Demand Characteristics
Consumer demand for pork, is relatively unresponsive to price changes
(inelastic). In practical terms, a one percent change in the price of pork generates
less than one percent change in the quantity demanded. Consumer demand for
pork is even less responsive to changes in consumer income. Table 1.2 summarizes estimates of responsiveness of the consumer purchases of pork, beef, veal,
other red meats, chicken and turkey.

Table 1.2. Price Responsiveness of consumer purchases for meats.
Percentage of
Change in the
Quantity of·

With respect to a one percentage change in the price of:
Beef

Pork

Meat

Beef and Veal
Pork
Other Meat
Chicken
Turkey

Other
Chicken

Turkey

Expen-

ditures

-1.3712

Source: Huang and Haidacher.

A
percent decrease in the price of pork at retail, holding the other prices
constant, will bring in about a 7 percent increase in pork consumption. Increases
or decreases in the price of substitutes - namely beef, chicken and turkey, also
has an influence on consumer purchases of pork. Beef is the chief competitor,
followed by chicken and turkey. Note, however, that a change in the pork price
impacts consumer purchases of chicken almost three times more than a one
percent change in the price of chicken on consumer purchases of pork, impacts
consumer purchases of beef twice as much as a 1 percent change in the price of
beef on pork consumption, and impacts purchases of turkey 18 times greater than
a 1 percent change in the price of turkey on pork consumption. A pork-demand
price elasticity of -.73, holding other prices constant, translates to a price
flexibility of -1.4. In practical terms, a percent increase in the quantity of pork
supplied would require about a 14 percent decrease in price to clear the market

Structural Change - Hog Production
Figure 1.1 shows the structural trends in hog production as represented by the
number of U.S. farms selling hogs and pigs by size groups. Between 1959 and
1987, the number of farms selling hogs and pigs declined by more than percent
(from
to
farms). The largest decline, 89 percent, has been in
the category marketing less than
head. For categories selling between

3

Source: Compiled from Rhodes

1-99 head
head
head

D

1959

1969

1978

head
over

1982

head

1987

Figure 1.1: Number of U.S. Hog Farms by Size Groups

and 199 head, and
and 499 head, the decline has been 79 percent (from
to
farms) and 44 percent (from 81,000 to 45,000 farms),
respectively. The only category showing a secular upward trend in numbers is the
category with more than 1000 head in sales (from
to 24,000). More
interestingly, within the 1000 and more category, the largest percentage increase
in the number of farms are those selling 5000 head and more (Figure 1.2). They
increased by 65 percent between the 1978 and 1987 census years (from 727 to
farms).
Larger size farms are also important in terms of their share of total hogs and
pigs marketings (Figure 1.3). The share in marketings of farms selling
head
and less decreased from 66.4 percent to 42.5 percent in 1987. The share in
marketings of farms selling 1000 head and more increased from 34 percent in
1978 to 58 percent in 1987. Likewise, the most noticeable increase in the share
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Figure 1.2: Number of Large US. Farms Marketing Hogs by Size Groups
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Figure 1.3: U.S. Marketings of Pork by Size of Farm
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1987
Source: Compiled from Rhodes

of marketings took place in farms selling
head and more. Their share of total
marketings increased from 7 percent in 1978 to 17.1 percent in 1987.
Figure 1.4 gives market shares of hogs and pigs by size of farm and by region.
The regions are the West North Central Region (WNC), the East North Central
Region(ENC),theNortheastemRegion(NE)theSouthAtlanticRegion(SA)the
South Central region
and the Western region (W)
Appendix for
definition of regions).
Percent
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Note that while market share of the com belt has been pretty stable between 1978
and 1987, the contribution of the region's smaller farms to total marketings of
hogs and pigs is proportionately higher than in other regions. The picture is clearer
on a state level. Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of marketing of pigs by size of
farm for the ten leading states in 1987. In Iowa, the leader in the total number of
total hogs marketed, about 43 percent of hogs still come from smaller farms
compared to percent from larger farms. On the other hand, in North Carolina,
which ranks 6th in total hog marketings, close to 58 percent of the volume comes
from farms marketing
head and more. We may tentatively conclude, that
the further away hog production is from com production, the larger the volume
(in percentage terms) from larger farms.

AR

NC

NE

Ml

KS

IN

IL

1A

MN

s,ooo
Source: Compiled from Rhodes

Figure 1.5: Distribution of Marketing of Pork by Size of Farm

The growth rates of marketings by size of farm also vary by region (Figure
1.6). Between the year 1982 and 1987 the largest growth in marketings from all
sizes occurred in the NE region. The WNC has actually shown a decline of 2
percent in marketings. However, for the com belt (WNC and ENC) as a whole,
there has been a net increase of only 4.6 percent. This compared to more than 14
percent in the NE and percent in the
region. The growth rate in marketings
from small farms
head) showed a decline in all regions except the
Nebraska growth in marketing from larger farms(>
head) was positive for
all regions with the largest gain in the
region.
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NE
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SA
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All sizes

<
Source: Compiled from Rhodes

Figure 1.6: Growth Rates, 1978-87 of Marketing Pork by Region and Farm Size

Structural Change - Hog Slaughter
While the hog slaughtering and processing industry has not experienced
significantly increased national concentration compared to beef (Table 1.3), it
has undergone major regional transformation in the
s. With the expansion
of IBP into hog slaughter, and the emergence of Excel and Conagra as major
players in the industry, the leading packers in the seventies have been replaced
by companies that specialize in high volume and low cost slaughter (Hayenga and
McDaniel). Evidence of this shift toward high volume hog slaughter is shown in
Figure 1.7 The growth in number and relative importance of hog slaughtering
plants has occurred only in those plants slaughtering more than one million head
annually. The share of the latter plants in total hog slaughter increased by more
than
percent between the year 1972 and 1988 and amounted to more than 75
percent of total U.S. hog slaughter (Figure 1.8). The consensus among those who
follow the industry closely is that hog slaughtering concentration will increase
over the next few years (Ward,
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Table 1.3. Concentration Ratios For U.S. Meatpacking, 1947-1987
Beef

CR4

Veal

CR8

CR4

Pork

Lamb

CR8

CR4

CR8

CR4

CR8

74
69
67
73
76
82
86
99

42
39
36
33
37
37
39

56
53

Percent

1947
1954
1958
1963
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987

36
31
26
26
25
44

74

43
38
34
35
42
36
55
92

49
41
36
37
27
32
55
85

56

61

44

54
57
55
58
59
76

46
56
74
99

48
55
59

CR4 and CR8 are respectively the percent of industry value of shipment by the
plants of the four and eight leading firms.
Source: Connor

Less than

.....
.....' :-.. ...:..· .:.: .-. .- .... ........ ........ ... .. ... ... ... . . . . .- .- .- . . . . ·-. ·-·.............. ..... ... .... .. .. .

'-----------------

... ____ _

... ..... .... .. .... .... .... .. .... ........ ....... ........ ........ ...... ... ..........:-.:-.:"lo------ ...... ..

.: .. =...::-.;:.-.-.-:...:::-::-.-.--·.···············--···············································

·--..:.::::.:.:..:-:-::.-:-:--:::::.::--=...-:-.
..-.··-;:_-_

·- ··-··- ··- -·-··-··- -·- ·

Year
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During this period of industry transformation, more than
plants have shut
down across the United States, as have 217 auction yards, 372 dealer and order
buyers and three terminal markets (McNabney). A consequence of this decline
is that fewer outlets are available for producers to sell their hogs. In a recent Farm
Bureau Survey, it was found that 76 percent of those that responded have access
to only one or two markets (McNabney).
With these structural changes, the question of competition, or lack thereof,
is often raised. There is concern among producers that fewer buyers may translate
to lower prices for their live animals. This concern is also voiced by economists
who believe that, since the bulk of the costs of business in meatpacking firms is
livestock, and selling margins are on the order of one to two percent, packers can
boost overall profits by percent simply by lowering prices paid to farmers by
just one tenth of one percent
Evidence to support packer competition or lack thereof is mixed. Miller and
Harris, using regional data, found that, indeed, an increase in packer concentration does depress live hog prices. Schroeter and Azzam
using national
data, concluded that 47 percent of the farm-to-retail margin for pork, can be
attributed to market power in the total meat industry from packing to retailing.
The part of the marketing channel which exerts the power is not clear in the
analysis. Azzam et al., also using national data, found no evidence of packer
powerduringtheeightiesandthefarm-to-wholesaleporkmarginwasjustenough
to cover hog processing costs. In another study, Schroeter and Azzam (Forthcoming) attempted to determine how much of the variation in the farm-to-wholesale
pork margin is due to market power and how much is due to output price risk.

Interestingly, Market power was the weakest component, while output risk was
the most prominent component in the margin.

The Economic Problem
The aforementioned characteristics of the sector, namely output and price
fluctuations, the trend toward more concentrated hog production and marketings
in larger size operations, and the trend toward larger scale slaughter operations
seem to suggest that the hog/pork sector is a good candidate for vertical
integration. The incentives for vertical integration, according to the popular
view, are created by the existence of transactional economies.
In practical terms, transactional economies exist when the cost of open
market exchange exceeds the costs of gaining control over quality, quantity, and
price of the intermediate product either through direct ownership or contracting.
If processors integrate to achieve the transactional economies and the market
remains competitive, the cost savings from integration eventually will be passed
on the producers or consumers.
Another less obvious phenomenon which gives rise to several incentives for
processors to vertically integrate, aside from transactional economies, is imperfect
competition. Imperfect competition may arise, for example, when there is only one
ora few hog buyers in the area. The incentives come from three sources: internalization
of the efficiency losses from imperfect competition, 2) the ability to extract rents from
the competitive producers, and 3) the ability to price discriminate between the
competitive producers of the intermediate inputs (Perry, 1978).

Objectives:
The specific objective of this report is to provide some insights on the likely
impacts of vertical integration when the incentives arise due to imperfect
competition. The report is not normative, i.e., designed to tell individual
producers what actions to take or not to take in the face of the changing structure
of the hog/pork industry. Rather, the report is to provide those representing the
interests of hog producers with an economic framework for evaluating the likely
price and quantity impacts of vertical integration under imperfect competition.
As a background, the next chapter will a) examine the concepts and
determinants of vertical integration in greater detail (both under the transactional
economies and the imperfect competition argument), b) report on results of a
survey of vertical integration by packers, and c) use the theory of vertical
integration under imperfect competition to develop a simulation model useful in
assessing the likely impacts of vertical integration in the pork industry.
The general objective of this report is to provide some insights into the nature
and determinants of vertical integration, and provide a theoretical and empirical
assessment of the likely impact of increased vertical control in the hog industry
on prices and quantities.
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CHAPTER II
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Definition
The simplest definition of vertical integration, for our purposes, is the linking
of two or more adjacent stages in the production-marketing process either
through direct ownership or contractual arrangements. This brings about the
question of how to define a stage. At the extreme, a stage of production can be
defined as any "distinct" activity involving the transformation of a raw product
into a consumer product Using this definition, packers can be characterized as
vertically integrated already; they kill the animal, clean the carcass, chill it, box
it, and perhaps transport it
To avoid the extreme definition of a vertical chain, Ikerd and Higgins (pp. 9suggest redefining vertical integration, especially in reference to food
processing, as "a combination of two or more stages of production and marketing
where a salable product exists at each stage or at least existed at some time in the
past."
Vertical integration may either be forward (closer to the consumer) or
backward (closer to the farmer). An example of forward integration would be a
packer (the upstream firm) vertically integrating into retailing (the downstream
firms). An example of backward integration would be a packer vertically
integrating into hog production. This report deals exclusively with backward
integration.
Backward integration may be accomplished through full ownership, contractual arrangements, or a combination thereof. Under full ownership, a business
gains permanentand complete control overneighboring stages ofproduction and
distribution. Under contractual arrangements, the link between the stages is
accomplished through contracts although ownership of the stages does not
change. "The greater the degree of control and the longer the duration of
contracts, the nearer contractual integration comes to being equivalent to
integration through ownership. The less the degree of control and the shorter the
duration of contracts, the nearer contractual integration comes to being equivalent to open market coordination" (Ikerd and Higgins, p.11).

Some Determinants of Vertical Integration:
As was alluded to earlier, the two broad determinants of vertical integration
are transactional economies and imperfect competition. Under transactional
economies, we shall discuss three main sources for the incentive to integrate,
namely risk and uncertainty, economic efficiency and assuring adequate supply
of inputs (Crieg).
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Transactional Economies
The more prone an industry is to uncertain supply of a material input, the more
likely it will opt for vertical integration or contracts as a risk-reducing strategy.
The economic rationale for this behavior is simple. Other inputs, such as labor
for example, have to be combined with the material input to produce a final
output Thus, as the material input becomes more "uncertain", the ability to
utilize the cost-minimizing levels of all inputs becomes more difficult. While
economies of scale may exist at all stages of production and/or marketing, it may
happen that one stage is subject to substantially more scale economies that the
next or previous stage. Earlier discussion in Chapter I on the emerging structures
in hog packing and hog production points to the divergent scales between the two
stages. Consequently, a packer may opt for integration though ownership or
contracts with several producers to match his scale of operation and, hence,
improve economic efficiency.
Uncertainty about the quality of inputs also induces business to integrate in order
to have a say about how the material input is produced. Obviously, vertical integration
through ownership gives the processor complete management control. Contractual
integration through market-specification contracts or resource providing contracts
also gives the processor some control over production practices.
Assurance of adequate supply is perhaps the most often cited incentive for
processors to integrate backward into agricultural production. According to Perry
( 1989), the notion of "assuring supplies" is more than just avoidance of random
fluctuations in input markets. It entails the inability to obtain the quantity and
quality of inputs that the firm would like to purchase at the prevailing price. As
such, it is a market imperfection and gives rise to transaction costs. The latter are
different from production costs in that they arise from using the open market for
transactions. Whether a business opts for market exchange or integration depends
on cost conditions of the processing plant, variability of the raw material flows,
and the cost associated with market exchange (Brand et al.). Following Brand et
al. consider Figure 2.1 where the U-shaped curve represent the average cost
Dollars/units

AC

1

Ac.r-......-t..-t-__;::-.,,__..--

Q.
Figure 2.1
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Quantity

function for a typical processing plant. The minimum average cost of production
occurs at point
If the firm is only able to purchase quantity Q 1, its average cost
of processing rises from
to AC 1 Whether the increase in costs is actually
between
and AC 1 or somewhere in between depends on the number of days
(shifts) the firm is compelled to operate at less than full capacity. For example,
if the processor operates at less than full capacity half of the time, then its annual
production will be at at an average cost of
The potential cost saving due
to integration are represented by the distance
to
Whether a business
integrates backward to assure supplies, depends on whether the cost savings more
than offset the costs of internally producing the material input or acquiring it
through contracts.

JmperfectCompetidon
Economic theory predicts that when a market for an intermediate input is
dominated by one buyer (monopsonist) or few buyers (oligopsonists) the price
and quantity of the intermediate inputs would be less than what they would be
had the market been perfectly competitive. The degree to which the quantity and
price of the input diverge from the competitive level depends on the degree of
market power exercised by the buyers of the intermediate inputs. The degree of
market power is a function of three things: The number of firms, the nature of
strategic behavior between the buyers, and the degree of supply response of the
producers of the intermediate inputs.
Economic theory also predicts that when the price of the intermediate inputs
diverges from its competitive levels, an efficiency loss arises. In practical terms,
the efficiency loss is the difference between the dollar loss to consumers and
producers (engendered by market imperfections) and the extra profits made by
the processor (also engendered by market imperfections). Interestingly, one way
for the processor to convert the efficiency loss to profits is through backward
integration.
To illustrate this economic phenomenon, Figure 2.2 shows the link between
the output market (panel a) and the input market (panel b). For our purposes, the
output market is the market for pork, and input market is the market for slaughter
hogs. In panel a, the demand for pork is shown as the downward sloping demand
curve D. The horizontal line, also in panel a, stands for the marginal processing
costs of slaughter hogs. For simplicity, we assume marginal cost (MC) is equal
to average cost (AC). The vertical distance between the demand curve D and the
horiwntal line MC=AC is the derived demand (DD) for live hogs (shown in panel
b). The curve
is the supply curve oflive hogs, where Q stands for both live
hogs and pork. TheintersectionofDDandS(Q,l)givesthe(equilibrium)quantity
of slaughter hogs, Q(l) bought by packers had the market been perfectly
competitive. The equilibrium price paid to producers is w(l ). The pork is sold to
the consumer at price p( 1) in panel a. If there is only one buyer in the market, or
a few buyers who behave like one, quantity
is the only quantity consistent
15
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Panel a: Output Market

w

w(l) 1--....;...,4-.----,.::C
w(o)

M.-,.f'.;"""

Q(I)

DD
Q(l)

Panel b: Input Market
Figure 2.2: A Graphical IDustration of the Relationship Between Integration, Prices and
Quantities

with maximum profit It is the quantity resulting from DD and
is
the schedule of additional expenditures a single buyer in the market must incur
to acquire additional hogs. At quantity
the price paid to the (non-integrated)
and the price paid by the consumer at retail is
Hence, as
producer is
one would expect, the margin under imperfect competition,
is wider
than the margin under perfect competition, P(l)-w(l). The efficiency loss from
restricting quantity and lowering the price to the producer is represented by the
triangle bed.
To see how integration converts the area bed to profits, note that profits to the
are represented by the area
abcl. At Q( 1), they are represented
packer at
by area w(l)acd. The difference between the two areas is the triangle bed. The
area
abd is the difference between the net revenue to the packer (net of other
processing costs)
and the cost of hogs
The area w(O)abcd
is the netrevenueOabQ(l) minus production costs OcQ(l) plus the rent paid to
the producers who integrate with the packer
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As will be apparent from the survey results, complete integration in hog
production is nonexistent. So one has to look at what is likely to happen when a
packer only partially integrates. The concept of partial integration can be easily
understood intuitively but is extremely difficult to handle theoretically. The
reason is that one has to a) say something about what the hog supply curve looks
like when there is partial integration, and b) what happens to the price received
by the independent producers. Professor Perry (1978), an eminent industrial
organization economist, has devised an economic model which handles the issue
of partial integration.
In the next chapter, we will outline our survey results. Our aim in the final
chapter of this report is to operationalire Perry's model and simulate likely
impacts on prices, quantities, and earnings of independent producers by degree
of integration in the industry.
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CHAPTER3
CURRENT STATUS-SURVEY
To assess the extent of contractual and/or ownership integration by packers,
requests for information were sent to both cattle and hog packers (small and large)
in the continental United States. From the surveys returned, 185 contained usable
information. The packers who responded did so voluntarily and may or may not
be representative of packers who did not respond. Therefore, one should be
cautious in drawing inferences about the whole population.

Characteristics of Respondents
A total of 185 packers responded to our survey: 83 from the North Central
(NC) region, 41 from the East Cost (EC) region, and 61 from the rest of the nation
Of the 185 packers,
slaughtered hogs: 62 in NC,
in EC and 38 in
Of the
who slaughtered hogs, 72reportedannual slaughterofless than
head, 27 slaughtered between
and
head, 9 slaughtered
between
and
and 14 slaughtered more
head. Seven of
the respondents did not report their slaughter volume. Of the 83 respondents in
NC, 25 percent slaughtered cattle only, percent slaughtered hogs only, and 45
percent slaughtered both. The total number of packers who slaughtered hogs was
62. About 85 percent of those slaughtering hogs also engaged in further
processing and 32 percent produced brand labels. Ninety four percent of the hog
packers operated 1 shift operations w bile 6 percent operated a 2 shift operations.
head. The
The 62 hog packers represented a daily slaughter capacity of
actual daily slaughter by the 62 firms was about
head/day, or 83 percent
of capacity. Sixty seven percent of total hog slaughter was done by the upper 9
percent of hog packers.
Twenty seven percent of the respondents in EC handled cattle only, 22
percent hog only, and 51 percent handled both. The total number of hog packers
was
87 percent of whom did both slaughter and processing, 37 percent did
slaughter and brand labels, and 27 percent engaged in slaughter, processing and
brand labels. Total slaughter capacity reported was 29,543 head/day. Actual
slaughter reported was 26,136 head/day. This represents about 78 percent
capacity. Ten percent of the respondents slaughtered 94 percent of the total
slaughter in the region.
slaughter cattle only,
Thirty nine percent of the respondents from
percent hogs only, and 43 percent do both. The maximum slaughter capacity
reported by hog packers in
was
head/day. The total head/day capacity
for all the respondents is
Actual slaughter reported was 3294 head/dy, or
73 percent capacity. Forty percent of slaughter was handled by 5 percent of the
respondents.
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Contractual and Ownership Integration
Both hog and cattle packers were asked to indicate the percentage of cattle
and hogs acquired from public markets, direct purchase, forward contracts,
custom lots/facilities and company owned lots/facilities. Responses were first
categorized by size of annual slaughter capacity nationally, then by region and
size of slaughter capacity. The annual slaughter size categories, for both cattle
99 ,999,
,999, and
head and
and hogs, are<
over.

National Breakdown by Size
As shown in Figure 3.1, hog packers who slaughtered
head or less
annually acquired about 38.56 percent of their hogs from public markets, 58.64
percent by direct purchase, and 2.67 percent through forward cash contacts. The
percentage of hogs actually owned and fed by the hog packer in company owned
percent The seventy two hog packers who
facilities represented only
responded to the survey represent more than half the actual packer population in
the<
category reported in 1988. Assuming the response to our survey is
representative of this category, and knowing that close to
hogs were
head and less category, roughly
hogs
slaughtered by packers in the
were owned and fed in packer-owned facilities. Figure 3.1, also shows the same
breakdown for beef packers in the same size category. Itis worth noting that while
acquiring cattle through contracts represents only 1 percent in this size category,
compared to 3 percent in hogs, about 5 percent of the cattle is actually owned in
this category. About two percent is owned and fed in custom lots and 3 percent
is owned and fed in company-owned lots.
Public Markets

Hogs

Direct Purchase

Figure 3.1: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer Size<

Cattle
head

Packer ownership of hogs in company-owned facilities is little bit higher in
percent of all hogs
the
to
head category. It represented about
in this category a range from
to percent The rest was acquired from either
public markets or direct purchase (Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 also shows how the
distribution of hogs by source compares with cattle. Again, cattle owned and fed
in company facilities in this category is more than three times that of hogs. One
beef packer in this category reported owning
percent of his slaughter cattle.

Hogs

Cattle

Figure 3.2: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source. Packer Size

99,999 head

Cattle

Hogs

Figure 3.3: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source. Packer Size 100,000 299,999 head

Cattle

Hogs
Figure 3.4: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source. Packer Size>

head

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the distribution of hogs by source for the two size
categories 100,000-299,999 head and >
head, respectively .. In the
,999 head category, none of the hogs were contracted orowned. On
the other hand, 1.43 percent of cattle in the same category were forward
contracted and close to 3 percent were owned and fed in custom lot facilities.
In the higher category,>
head (Figure 3 .4 ), close to 8 percent of hogs
fall in the captive category, of which 3.64 percent is forwardcontracted,2 percent
is owned and fed in custom facilities, and 1.86 percent in company-owned
facilities. Assuming the proportion of the captive hog supplies are representative
of the population (57 plants), the total number of hogs in>
category is
roughly 5.8 million head. Beef packers in this category, on the other hand,
acquired about 11 percent of their supply through contracts and 1.4 percent
through ownership and feeding in custom lots.
Figure 3.5 summarizes the above information across sizes. It is worth noting
that while contracting and ownership of cattle seems to take place across all sizes
in beef packing, it is mostly prevalent ·among the large sizes in hog packing.
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Figure 3.5: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle By Source and Category

Regional Breakdown by Size
North Central Region
Thirty one of the respondents from NC reported annual hog slaughter of
or less, eleven reported annual slaughter between
and
head, 6 between
and
head and, 3 slaughtered over
head
annually, and 3 did not answer. Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of hogs by
slaughter capacity and source. The percentages indicate on the average, the bulk
of slaughter hogs in NC are still acquired through public markets (43 percent) and
direct purchase (53 percent). Cash forward contracts were less than 1 percent of
all volume. The breakdown of source of hogs by slaughter capacity, on the other
hand, shows contracting activity among the large packers only (4 percent of the
hogs in this category were acquired through forward contracts).

Public Markets
Custom

Direct Purchase
Company

Forward Contracts

Figure 3.6: NC Slaughter Hogs/Cattle By Source and Category
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East Coast Region
Eighty one of the respondents from EC reported annual hog slaughter of
or less, 5 reported annual slaughter between
and
head, 1
head
between
and
head , and 5 slaughtered over
annually. Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of hogs acquired by slaughter capacity
and by source. The average for the region indicate that close to percent of the
hogs falls in the category of captive supplies, of which 7.33 percent were acquired
through forward contracts,
percent through ownership in custom facilities,
and 1.33 percent through ownership in company-owned facilities. The eighteen
packers in the<
category reported an average captured supply of 11.23
percent,
of which was acquired through contracts and .56 percent through
ownership in company-owned facilities.
The five packers in the top slaughter category(>
reported an average
captured supply of 20 percent, 2 percent of which was through forward contracts,
9.33 through ownership in custom facilities, and 8.67 percent in company-owned
facilities . Ownership in custom facilities ranged from no-ownership to 28
percent. Ownership in company-owned facilities ranged from 1 to 22 percent.
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Markets
Custom Lots

Direct Purchase
Company
Lots
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Figure 3.7: EC Slaughter Hogs/Cattle By Source and Category

Rest of Nation
From the 37 packers who reported hog slaughter in
24 were in the<
10,000 category, 11 in the 10,000-100,000 category and only 2 in the 100,000 and
over. The percentages for the
were as follows: 32.41 % of the hogs were
acquired from public markets, 66.78% by direct purchase, and .81 percent
through ownership in company owned facilities. Company ownership of hogs
was reported in
category where the average percentage of hogs
obtained through company-ownership was 2.73 percent, with a range from
to
23

percent. Figure 3.8 summarizes the percentage of hogs acquired by region and

by source.

EC

NC
Public Markets
Purchase

Forward Contract

Forward Contract

Company Owned Lots

Figure 3.8: Slaughter Hogs by Source and Region
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CHAPTER
PRICE AND
IMPACTS OF VERTICAL
CONTROL IN IMPERFECT MARKETS
a) The Graphical Model
The graphical illustration of the simulation model is presented in panel b of
Figure 2.2. Let (I) denote the degree of integration, i.e, the fraction of hog
suppliers integrated with the packer. Then
is the new supply curve after
that partial integration. Note that as the degree of vertical integration, I, increases
moves toward
the supply curve of the industry which represents
the production costs of the processor when he integrates totally in the production
of hogs, i.e I= 1. In the egg industry, for example, (I) would be close to 98 percent
Note also as
rotates clockwise toward
the quantity of slaughter
hogs produced approaches the quantity under perfect competition. Hence, when
a processor is fully integrated, theory predicts a larger quantity of processed
material would be produced and the consumer will benefit from the lower price
p(l).
At the new supply curve
the quantity is Q(I). The question is what is
the impact on the quantity of hogs and the price of hogs paid to independent
producers as the degree of integration (I) increases. To answer the question, we
developed a simple economic simulation model based on Perry's theoretical
insights. Following Perry (1978), we avoid the complication of modeling
strategic behavior between several processors, and model the problem if there
was one sole buyer or a dominant buyer with a competitive, though insignificant,
fringe. The model is presented without complete mathematical detail. The
complete derivations are available form the author.

The Algebraic Presentation
Let the initial quantity Q(O) be
and the initial price W(O) be 1. Denote
the hog supply elasticity by (es), denote the hog (derived) demand elasticity by
(ed), the total quantity of slaughter hogs processed by the packer by (Q), and the
price of slaughter hogs by w. Let the supply function (Q, 1) (see graph 2.2) take
the constant elasticity form:

where

(1)

The derived demand function, DD on the graph, takes the constant elasticity
form:

=A

where t=l/ed

A and Bare constants. The schedule

marginal to
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(2)

is then

=
The schedule
following relationship:

=

between

(3)
and

where Z =

(l+s)

is represented by the

(4)

1
l

1+I[(l+s) 5 -l]
Note that when the degree of integration is complete (I= 1) we are back to
equation (1) which gives the supply function under full integration, and this
supply function becomes the packers' internal cost schedule of production hogs.
When there is no integration (1=0), we are back to equation (3) which stands
for the marginal expenditure function of a monopsonist. To solve for the actual
quantity of hogs slaughtered (Q) after a given degree of vertical integration (I),
wemustequate(2)and(4)andsolveforQ(I). Todosohowever,rememberthat,
since the supply price is initialized to 1 and the initial quantity supplied is
initialized at 100, B must be equalto l<Xr, and A must be equal to
With
that in mind, the quantity of hogs slaughtered (Q) at each level of integration (I)
is given by

Q(l)

=

the price received by independents is,

w(Q,I)= B(QZ)'
and the net earnings (revenues minus variable costs) by independent producers
as a function the degree of integration are

R(l)

=((l-1/(l+s))w(Q,l)q'Z'

Simulation Results:
To simulate the above model, we need infonnation on the elasticities (degrees
ofresponse) of hog supply and derived demand. For the initial run, we set the
elasticity of hog derived-demand at-.568 (estimated independently by Schroeter
and Azzam (1990)) and varied the elasticity of supply from .403 (also estimated
by Schroeter and Azzam ( 1990)) to 1·and then 1.5. This pretty much covers the
range of available supply elasticities available in the literature (short and long
run). Figure 4. la plots the numerical results under the three scenarios. Indeed, as
the degree of integration increases, hog slaughter also increases. For example, at
an elasticity of demand of -.568 and an elasticity of supply of .40, a level of
percent integration will bring forth about 3.8 percent increase in hog slaughter.
Figure 4.1 also shows that as hog supply becomes more responsive, the quantity
26
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of hogs forthcoming in the market is also higher. Figure 4.lb shows the
relationship between the degree of vertical integration and hog slaughter under
varying demand responses, holding the supply elasticity at a value of
The
more responsive is the demand curve the more quantity of hogs forthcoming
under increasing levels of vertical integration. This also implies that the
consumer benefits from lower prices of pork as output expands.
Figure 4.2a demonstrate the relationship between the degree of integration
and the quantities of hogs purchased from independents. Obviously, although the
total quantity of hogs slaughtered increased, the quantity purchased from
independent hog producers is predicted by the model to decrease by more than
the increase slaughter. For example, at
percent level of integration, total
slaughter goes up by 3.8 percent but the quantity purchased form independents
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declines by 13 .3 percent. This means, given the magnitude of supply and demand
elasticities, that the 17 percent of the hogs is being captive by the processor.
Figure 4.2b shows the same relationship between the degree of integration and
purchases of independents under varying demand responses.
According to figure 4.3a, the price to independents also declines. At the ten
percent level of integration the price paid to independents declines by about six
percent. At fifty percent integration, the price declines by about 26 percent. The
more responsive the hog supply curve, the steeper the decline in the price of
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independents. Similarly, the more elastic the demand curve, the steeper the price
decline received by independents.
Figure 4 .4 shows the decline in earnings as the degree of vertical integration
increases. Since both the price paid to independents and quantity purchased from
independents decline with vertical integration, their earnings naturally decline.
However, the decline in earnings is faster than the decline in both the price and
quantity. For example, at a level of vertical integration of IO percent, the quantity
purchased from independents declines form
to 88 ( 12 percent), price declines
to 82.13 (18 percent).
from 1 to .937 (6 percent), and earnings decline from
Note also that the more responsive the supply curve, the steeper the decline in
earnings to independents.
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We should remind the reader that the importance of the above results lie in
their qualitative rather than quantitative dimensions. They also provide a
background for various hypotheses to be tested as integration proceeds in the
industry. The quantitative results are the creature of the nature of supply and
demand response assumed to be taking place in the hog/pork complex. As one
assumes different supply and demand elasticities one would get different
quantitative results. However, the qualitative directions indicate that increased
packer integration in the hog industry is likely to increase overall pork production, reduce prices to the consumer, lower the price of hogs to the independent
producer.
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APPENDIX
Definition of Regions
West North Central Region (WNC)
Iowa

South Central Region (SC)
Alabama

Kansas

Arkansas

Minnesota
Missouri
North Dakota
Nebraska
South Dakota

Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Texas

East North Central Region (ENC)
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin

Western Region (W)

Arkansas

Arizona
California
Colorado
Hawaii
Idaho
Montana
New Mexico
Nevada
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Wyoming

Northeastern Region (NE)
Connecticut
Massachusetts

Maine

New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Vermont
South Atlantic Region (SA)
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Virginia
West Virginia
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